In the early 1950s, Henry Kissinger completed his doctoral
dissertation at Harvard. He studied the decade following the French Revolution,
from 1812-1822 in which two world leaders took very different approaches to
putting their countries in positions of potential power. Henry Kissinger details
how British Foreign Secretary, Viscount Robert
Castlereagh and Austrian Foreign Minister Prince Clemens von
Metternich applied doctrines of “non-interference”
and “legitimacy,” respectively, to “[rescue] stability from seeming chaos…”[1]
This is an interesting piece to relook given today’s
context. Many recent works have wondered what the state and future of world
order holds. Consider Foreign Affairs journal’s edition that kicked off the New
Year: Out of Order.
The National Intelligence Council recently released their Global Trends future
forecast – Paradox of
Progress – in which they observe
that “the emerging global landscape is drawing to a close an era of American
dominance following the Cold War. So, too, perhaps is the rules-based
international order that emerged after World War II.” Similarly, the Brookings Institute has also taken on new
effort to understand the implications recent political and social changes
will have on the order that emerged out of WWII.
In these moments, when future projections come from many
directions, I find it useful to rewind the historical clock and see how the
world dealt with itself during analogous times of uncertainty. Hence, let us look
at how Kissinger portrays the post-French Revolution period in which much of
the world was in serious upheaval and Eurasian states were jockeying for
positions of power. Take a look at the following links related to Kissinger’s 1957
book, which was a publication of his Harvard dissertation. Note the
circumstances he identifies regarding chaos and uncertainty about the order of
Europe.
When Napoleon was defeated in
Russia, the problem of constructing a legitimate order confronted Europe in its
most concrete form…It is for this reason that the year 1812 is the starting
point of our discussion. However one conceives it—and it has been given a
variety of interpretations ranging from the moral vindication of national
self-determinations to the tragic destiny of the Hero—this year marked the
moment when it became evident that Europe was not to be organized by force. But
the alternative was not nearly so apparent. It was clear that there were new
forces loose in the world clamouring [sic] for popular participation in
government.[2]
See also the
challenge Britain and Austria faced given their geographic and political
situations of the time.
Every statesman must attempt to
reconcile what is considered just with what is considered possible. What is
considered just depends on the domestic structure of his state; what is possible
depends on its resources, geographic position and determination, and on the
resources determination and domestic structure of other states. Thus
Castlereagh, secure in the knowledge of England’s insular safety, tended to
oppose only overt aggression. But Metternich, the statesman of a power situated
in the centre [sic] of the Continent, sought above all to forestall upheavals.[3]
Britain was an insulated state, protected somewhat by
geography from the geopolitical risk of self-interested neighbors. Geopolitical
competitors, on the other hand, surrounded Austria. Consequently, the two
states, and the two statesmen, viewed their potential risks and opportunities
through different frames of reference. Imagine for a moment the distinct frames
of reference each might have had given their particular positions in the world.
Now, consider how states today view themselves with respect to other states and
other emerging forms of global power given their particular political
circumstance.
There are many lessons to learn from Castlereagh and
Metternich and from how Britain and Austrian dealt with resettling following a
tumultuous upset to the international order. Some questions I would ask now: is
the analogy useful; is the analogy to today’s international system actually
analogous; do the doctrines of non-intervention and legitimacy still hold in
today’s global restructuring? That is why I am convinced, that as we discuss
the nature of global order today, we need to also study how order has evolved.
Here are some options to read more from Kissinger’s
dissertation-turned-book:
